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LOG-ROLLING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
MICHAEL J. WAGGONER
Much is written about judicial review. Too little of this writing
also examines the legislative processes the judiciary is reviewing.'
This essay is intended as a step toward remedying that deficiency.'
Its purpose is to be thought-provoking and readable rather than ex-
haustive or definitive. Thus it will often rely on the reader's knowl-
edge rather than on documentation.
A brief synopsis: Our democracy operates, as it should, much
less by majority will than by minorities trading votes, also known as
log-rolling. The appreciation that democracy operates through log-
rolling reinforces the judiciary's traditional role of safeguarding the
political process. In addition, the judiciary should enforce the consti-
tutional requirement that legislation be general rather than narrow.
The generality requirement, an aspect of the doctrine of separation
of powers, is found by interpretation in the Constitution and Bill of
Rights as a restraint on the federal government, and is explicit in the
fourteenth amendment as a restraint on state governments. In con-
flict with the generality requirement are practical political forces
which impel the legislature to enact particularized laws. The essay
ends with a few suggestions on how legislators and judges might deal
with this tension between constitutional requirements and practical
politics.
I. DEMOCRACY
That judges appointed for life are able to frustrate the will of
legislators, chosen for limited terms by popular election, may seem
an anomaly in a democractic society. That anomaly might be ex-
plained by the existence of a written constitution intended to be the
1. The works 1 found most helpful are J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 80-87, 151-61 (1980) and Bishin, Judicial Review in Democratic The-
ory, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1099 (1977). See also A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-21 (1962); J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980); Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judi-
cial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1952).
2. This comment will not explore such related areas as the review of administrative or
executive action, the problems of conflicts between legislative and executive branches, nor the
policing of such particular federal policies as prevention of discrimination against the com-
merce or citizens of other states.
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supreme law of the land. The questions remain why there should be
such a constitution and why the judiciary should have ultimate re-
sponsibility for interpreting it. The answers require a brief examina-
tion of democracy.
Democracy, if viewed simply as government by the will of the
majority, has little ethical appeal. The fact that 51% of a group is in
favor of a particular project and the remainder of the group opposed
provides little help in coming to a principled decision on whether
that project should be undertaken. That 49% rather than 51% lose
would help only the devout utilitarian or the expedient to evaluate
outcomes. Nor is there any measure here of the intensity of concern
of members of either group, so that one person's whim counts as
much as another's ultimate value. This simplified view of democracy,
however, is seriously misleading. To have an accurate picture it is
necessary to consider both some of the reasons for majority rule and
how majority rule is likely to be practiced.
Majority rule seems not to be a value for its own sake. It is
rather merely one of the mechanisms by which citizens participate in
the operation of a government that has many purposes.8 Participa-
tion in the processes of government may be considered a value for its
own sake, one of the experiences a life should include. Participation
may also be a means to achieve other ends. Wide participation in
government may be valued because of skepticism: no one can be
fully trusted, so power should be divided and shared. This suggests
that participation is a duty to fellow citizens, as well as right for
oneself. Wide participation may also be a source of the government's
legitimacy, 4 other sources such as hereditary monarchy and the
blessing of the church having declined in the industrialized nations.
Thus majority rule provides a useful mechanism to implement other
values, rather than being valuable in and of itself. The goal is the
good life, an aspect of the good life is wide participation in the politi-
cal process, and majority rule is but the mechanism needed to make
3. The Declaration of Independence states its "self-evident" premise that "governments
are instituted" to preserve the "unalienable rights ... life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
ness." The Constitution states its purpose as being "to form a more perfect union, establish
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty .... The Pledge of Allegiance concludes with a
promise (or hope) that this Republic provides "liberty and justice for all."
4. The Declaration of Independence speaks of "governments . ..deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed." The only source of legitimacy invoked by the Con-
stitution is, "We the People of the United States ... do ordain and establish this Constitution
of the United States of America."
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decisions when there is wide participation.
Majority rule as practiced is heavily influenced by three major
factors: (1) There are a great many public issues to be decided; (2)
most people are little concerned about most issues, so that typically
persons with strong commitments on how any particular issue is re-
solved will constitute relatively small minorities; (3) those united on
one issue will be divided on other issues.
Because of these three factors democracy is not merely a matter
of the majority working its will. The opposing minorities seriously
concerned about a particular issue normally do not have enough
votes among themselves to decide the matter.5 Of course some votes
will be obtained by persuasion. But there is often little time for per-
suasion, particularly if the issues are numerous, as we assume them
to be, and complex and with fairly evenly balanced pros and cons, as
is often the case. In such circumstances those seriously concerned
minorities may be expected to attempt to "buy" enough votes from
the unconcerned to become a majority on that issue. They will pay
for the unconcerned votes by "selling" their votes on other issues.
This process of trading votes is commonly called "log-rolling."' It
should be emphasized that these references to buying and selling
votes are not pejorative. On the contrary, as is set forth below, this
process of exchanging votes provides the principled justification for
democracy that mere "majority will" fails to provide.
Intensity of concern should be reflected in vote trading. How
much one will pay for a vote on a particular matter is based on such
factors as how many votes are available to be sold, the intensity of
concern, and the chances of success. A person may choose not to buy
votes on his matter of greatest concern, because he thinks that he
and his allies do not have the resources or concern to out-bid his
opponents; he will instead try for something of lesser concern but
greater likelihood of reasonably-priced success. The invisible hand of
competition is likely to produce from this market place of votes the
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (Madison) suggests that majorities are undesirable in a po-
litical system. That article is addressed to the problem of controlling "factions," which (with a
little editing) are defined so broadly as to include most political interest groups: "a number of
citizens actuated by some common impulse . . . adverse to the rights of other citizens." Fac-
tions are to be controlled by having a republic large and diverse enough that no faction is
likely to be able to constitute a majority, so that those committed to a particular position will
be required to seek and obtain the support of the uncommitted in order to prevail. See also
THE FEDERALIST No. 51.
6. This use of the term has been traced back to 1823. See 6 THE OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 404 (1933).
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greatest good for the greatest number. A person of course might vote
based on a whim, but the more sensible, and thus more common,
approach would be to trade that vote for votes on other matters of
greater concern.
Even persons whose views on each issue are opposed to the
views of a majority in the society can expect to win on a few issues
through log-rolling. On some of those issues persons in the minority
will be trying to buy the votes of any less concerned member of the
majority, by selling to such a person votes on other issues of more
concern to him on which he is in the minority. The competition for
votes between the committed members of the majority and minority
will produce a market in which the people always in the minority
can trade for the votes necessary to win on some issues. It is obvious
that people with such consistently eccentric views cannot hope to win
as often as would be expected for persons whose ideas are nearer the
mainstream. It is more interesting and more important that such ec-
centrics, in the minority on every issue, can nonetheless expect to
win on some issues. Democracy under the influence of these three
factors - many issues, most of concern to relatively few citizens, who
will form shifting coalitions - thus does measure intensity of commit-
ment and also makes it unlikely that anyone will lose on all issues.
Adding a few complications to this model of our political system
should make it a fair representation for purposes of considering judi-
cial review. First, log-rolling may not involve explicit vote sales.7 In-
stead there may be a general sense that if a person votes as a col-
league requests on one matter, that colleague is likely to honor a
request from that person on how to vote on another matter. As the
late Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn is reputed to have told new
members, "To get along, go along." Informal log-rolling is still log-
rolling.
Second, our political system at local, state, and federal levels
operates largely by representative, rather than direct, democracy.
Log-rolling should be expected both in the legislative process by
which the representatives enact laws and in the electoral process by
which citizens choose representatives.8 The representatives in the
legislative process are likely to engage in log-rolling as described
7. Explicit vote trades may be illegal. For example, COLO. CONST. art. V, § 40, prohibits
legislators selling votes for votes.
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 35 (Hamilton) notes that it is not possible to have members of
every interest in the legislature, so that a person of one occupation will be required to represent
the wishes of those in other occupations. The same theme returns in THE FEDERALIST No. 56.
This suggests that log-rolling was expected at the electoral level as well as in the legislature.
[Vol. 52
LOG-ROLLING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
above. They are likely to have the time and the expertise to engage
in the bargaining log-rolling requires. The legislature thus operates
in a manner resembling such commercial institutions as stock or
commodity exchanges, with the legislators having a role analogous to
that of brokers.
Citizen participation in the electoral process varies from not
even voting to contributing substantial effort and resources even be-
tween electoral campaigns to particular candidates, political parties,
or causes. Those who are most involved may engage in log-rolling as
discussed above. Persons towards the passive end of the spectrum,
however, are likely to decide whether to vote and for whom based on
a candidate's statements on only one or two matters. Yet, the log-
rolling here differs only in style from that discussed above. Candi-
dates will compete in selecting patterns of statements that will at-
tract as many votes as possible from these more passive participants,
while minimizing loss of votes here and elsewhere along the spec-
trum. All along the spectrum majorities or pluralities are being as-
sembled from groups of citizens of differing views - that at one end
the initiative may be with the citizens and at the other with the can-
didates does not preclude fairly characterizing both as log-rolling.
Finally, the political process is not concerned merely with votes
but also with such producers of votes as wealth, prestige, the ability
to persuade, hard work, patronage, and other ways in which people
influence each other. This complication means that peoples' political
powers differ despite "one person, one vote," and that with many
media of exchange available many different bargains are possible.
Still, it is log-rolling.
II. RESTRAINTS ON DEMOCRACY
The discussion thus far has not considered what questions the
political system is to decide. The premise is that the poltical system
is a neutral mechanism for resolving disputes, deciding any question
enough citizens or their representatives want decided, and deciding
that question according to any set of beliefs or values with enough
support to prevail. The political system is concerned with the
breadth and intensity of support for a particular viewpoint and with
the skill with which that support is employed, but the political sys-
tem otherwise generally has no preferences. Some matters, however,
are specially treated. They have been decided by the Constitution,
rather than being left to normal operation of the political system.
These matters should be examined in a context of log-rolling to sepa-
rate those particularly needing judicial enforcement from other con-
19801
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stitutional provisions where more deference to the legislature may be
appropriate. Of course deference to the legislature's choices is the
norm, because on most choices the Constitution does not speak, or it
commits the decision to the legislature, or there is insufficient reason
not to defer. Lack of deference receives more attention because it is
unusual, like the dog not barking.
One sometimes finds statements in judicial opinions suggesting
that the courts should defer to the wisdom or judgment of the legis-
lature. Of course, one expects important institutions to operate
wisely, and legislators by and large are capable people, acting in the
public interest as they see it. A legislator will be reluctant to vote for
a bill which appears to him (or which may be made to appear to his
constituents) to be foolish or otherwise contrary to the public inter-
est, even if his vote would produce others' votes needed for a matter
of great importance to him or to his constituents. But a legislature
should not be viewed as a temple of wisdom. Rather, a legislature is
a place to resolve conflict, a refined substitute for a market place or
a battle ground.' Legislative determinations should be accepted by a
court, not so much because they are wise, as because, by analogy to
the doctrine of res judicata, another forum's resolution of a particu-
lar conflict should normally be followed, unless some other principle
can be opposed to the general rule of deference. To those other prin-
ciples we now turn.
The Constitution suggests two concerns which may reduce the
deference the judiciary owes to the political process. One, the integ-
rity of the political process must be preserved, and two, legislation is
intended to decide general policies rather than particular cases. Af-
ter a brief discussion of the former, the remainder of this essay will
be devoted to discussion of the requirement that legislation be
general.
Preserving the Political Process
Judicial protection of the political process, through such means
as enforcement of the first amendment's guarantees of freedom of
the press and of speech, has a long history. 10 Viewing the political
process as log-rolling suggests two reasons why that protection is im-
portant. First, log-rolling theory provides a practical justification for
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (Madison) states, "No man is allowed to be a judge in his
own case," then asks, "What are the ... legislators but advocates and parties to the causes
which they determine?"
10. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, chs. 12-13 (1978).
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the protection of ideas. To protect obscure ideas on the ground that
they might eventually receive majority support may seem unrealistic,
as only the smallest fraction of obscure ideas are ever more than
obscure ideas. The theory of log-rolling suggests, however, that an
idea need not have majority support to be implemented, and proba-
bly most legislation is not supported by or even known to a majority
of society. Rather, the votes needed to produce a majority are pur-
chased from those unconcerned or even mildly opposed to the idea.
Thus log-rolling suggests that judicial protection of obscure ideas is
not just abstract idealism.
Second, log-rolling emphasizes the need to preserve the
processes of the next election. The government may tend to follow
the wishes of its citizens as much because another election is to be
anticipated as because offices are held by winners of the most recent
election." One often has difficulty in getting an agent to do as the
agent has been instructed. This problem may be even more serious in
politics, as campaign promises cannot be specifically enforced. The
issues to be decided during the term of office may not have been
foreseen during the last election. But public officers are likely to keep
a close eye on their constituents' concerns because of the desire to
win the next election. Campaign promises are enforced primarily by
the threat of retaliation at the next election if they are broken. Al-
though citizens in general may not pay close attention to the activi-
ties of their representative, the representative's opponent is likely to
bring to the constituents' attention differences between their views
and their representative's activities. Log-rolling works as intended if
each officer seeks to win the next election by coalition building, but
not if the officer seeks to silence potential opponents or to disen-
franchise some of his constituents. Log-rolling emphasizes that a
change in electoral result is not caused only by a change in opinions
by the electorate. That change may also occur, though opinions are
constant, because of shifting coalitions. Those in the past minority
may be joined by a few from the past majority, changing the past
minority into a majority at the next election. Moreover, those who
lose one election would seem more likely to accept that decision if
they can confidently look forward to a future, fair contest. This focus
on the next election by the public officers and their opponents re-
quires that the integrity of the processes of that election be pre-
served. Thus viewing the political system as log-rolling emphasizes
11. See THE FEDERALIST No. 57.
1980]
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the need for the courts to enforce those portions of the'Constitution
providing for the operation of the political process.
Generality in Legislation
The Constitution's Requirement
Although no provision of the Federal Constitution expressly pro-
vides that legislation must determine general principles rather than
decide particular cases, a requirement of generality may be inferred
from three different types of provisions: those limiting legislative ac-
tion in regard to individuals, those requiring uniformity or prohibit-
ing discrimination, and those establishing procedures. Of course
"general principles" and "particular cases" are not opposite sides of
a coin but rather ways of characterizing different portions of a spec-
trum. As such there can be no sharp line between them, they must
instead be matters of continuing dispute. That these terms are not
precise does not mean that they are not useful, of course, as many
important legal concepts are necessarily vague.
The Federal Constitution authorizes the Congress to decide only
limited types of individual cases, i.e. each house's powers in regard
to its own members and officers, the impeachment process, and the
Senate's power to confirm appointments. 1' Generally Congress is
precluded from deciding individual cases by the prohibition against
bills of attainder 3 and the limitation on judgment in impeachment
to removal and disqualification from office.' 4 The prohibition against
ex post facto laws" may in part be intended to prevent legislative
determination of individual cases: without the prohibition, a legisla-
tive majority might scan a person's past for an unusual act which
could then retroactively be outlawed, thus permitting the imposition
of criminal sanctions.
Several provisions of the Federal Constitution require uniform-
ity or prohibit certain preferences. These include the requirement
that "Duties, Imposts and Excises . . . be uniform,"' 6 the authoriza-
tion to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform
12. These powers include the House's power to elect its officers and impeach (art. 1, § 2,
cl. 5); the Senate's power to elect its officers (art. 1, § 3, cl. 5), to try impeachments (art. 1, §
3, cl. 6), and to confirm appointments (art. 11, § 2, cl. 2); and the power of each house to judge
the qualifications of its members (art. 1, § 5, cl. 1) and to expel a member (art. 1, § 5, cl.2).
13. Art. I, § 9, cl. 3; state legislatures are similarly restricted by art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
14. Art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
15. Art. 1, § 9, cl. 3 as to Congress; art. I, § 10, cl. I as to the states.
16. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
[Vol. 52
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Laws on . . . bankruptcies,"' 17 the requirement that direct taxes be
apportioned,18 and the prohibition against preferring the ports of one
state over those of another." These provisions seem primarily in-
tended to prevent discrimination between states, though some would
also apply to other kinds of discrimination.
Even before the Bill of Rights was enacted the Constitution con-
tained various procedural safeguards. These include habeas corpus,20
provision for federal courts with judges holding office during good
behavior 2 1 and - in criminal cases - trial to a jury and in the state
where the crime was committed. The Bill of Rights soon added a
variety of procedural protections available in civil or criminal pro-
ceedings or against government action generally2 s These procedural
provisions complement the substantive provisions discussed above re-
stricting legislative determination of individual cases and requiring
uniformity. The substantive provisions suggest that legislative action
must be general, the procedural provisions require that particular-
ized action be accompanied by various safeguards. Put another way,
this dichotomy represents the principle of separation of powers. Par-
ticular cases are decided by courts, general policies are established
by the legislature. Just as courts should be alert to the possibility
that their actions may violate the doctrine of separation of powers,2
so too should legislatures.
17. Id., cl. 4.
18. Art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
19. Id., cl. 5.
20. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
21. Art. 111,.§ 1.
22. Art. I1l, § 2, cl. 3.
23. The provision in the fifth amendment prohibiting deprivation "of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law," although obviously procedural, may also contain a sub-
stantive requirement of generality. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535-36
(1884), quoted in Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories,
89 YALE L. J. 1063, 1066 n.9:
It is not every act, legislative in form, that is law. Law is something more than mere
will exerted as an act of power. It must not be a special rule for a particular person
or a particular case, . . . thus excluding, as not due process of law, acts of attainder,
bills of pains and penalties, acts of confiscation, acts reversing judgments, and acts
directly transferring one man's estate to another, legislative judgments and decrees,
and other similar special, partial and arbitrary exertions of power under the forms
of legislation.
More recently the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the fifth amendment's due process of law
restriction on the federal government has the same substantive meaning as does the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection limitation on the states, discussed below. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954), United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
24. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30
STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978).
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The discussion thus far has emphasized barriers created by the
Constitution between the branches of the federal government and
the people they govern. 5 By the period after the Civil War similar
barriers were being created between state governments and the gov-
erned. The two most important of those barriers added to the Fed-
eral Constitution are in the fourteenth amendment: complementary
provisions require a certain generality (the Equal Protection Clause)
and require procedural safeguards before taking actions against per-
sons (the Due Process of Law Clause). Those barriers were also be-
ing built at the state level. For example, many provisions of the Col-
orado Constitution of 1876, typical of its contemporaries in this
regard, restricted the legislature's authority to deal with narrow or
particular matters.2
25. As indicated in notes 13 and 15 supra, the original constitution prohibited bills of
attainder and ex post facto laws by states as well as by the federal government.
26. The following provisions of the Colorado Constitution of 1876 restricted the legisla-
ture's authority to deal with narrow or particular matters:
"[Wihether the contemplated use [for which property is taken through eminent domain]
be really public shall be a judicial question, and determined as such without regard to any
legislative assertion that the use is public." Art. II, § 15. This provision accepts the legisla-
ture's authority to condemn a particular piece of property-narrow authority yet necessary
because a part of the decision whether to build a school or highway is where to build it-but
checks that authority by requiring more strict judicial scrutiny.
"The general assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumer-
ated cases .. " Twenty-three cases are enumerated, including "granting divorces .... chang-
ing county seats . . . providing for changes of venue in civil or criminal cases .... the protec-
tion of game or fish . . . granting . . . the right to lay down railroad tracks .. " It then
concludes, "in all other cases, where a general law can be made applicable, no special law
shall be enacted." Art. V, § 25.
Art. V, § 38 prohibits the general assembly from releasing or transferring obligations
owed the state or a municipal corporation, providing instead for extinguishing such obligations
only on payment to the proper treasury.
"All laws relating to state courts shall be general and of uniform operation throughout the
state. ... Art. VI, § 28.
"The general assembly shall ... provide for . . . a thorough and uniform system of free
public schools .. " Art. IX, § 2.
"All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects ... and shall be levied and
collected under general laws .. " Art. X, § 3. That article also provides that the state cannot
impose taxes for a city (id. § 7) and that no city or inhabitants can be released from its
proportionate share of state taxes (id. § 8).
"The general assembly shall have no power to remove the county seat of any county, but
the removal of county seats shall be provided for by general law [requiring a majority vote in
the county]." Art. XIV, § 2.
"No charter of incorporation shall be granted . . . by special law . . . but the general
assembly shall provide by general laws for the organization of corporations hereafter to be
created." Art. XV, § 2.
"No street railroad shall be constructed within any city . . . without the consent of the
local authorities .... Art. XV, § I1. This has been interpreted as a restraint on the general
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This concern with the risk of abuses by state legislatures is to be
expected based on the log-rolling model. As the political community
becomes smaller in population and geography, the risk increases that
the three conditions for log-rolling will not adequately develop. Fed-
eralist No. 10 warns that in small political units a faction may con-
stitute a majority and easily co-ordinate its evil plans. Less dramatic,
there may be a significant portion of the citizenry with similar views
on most major issues, rather than those allied on one issue being
opposed on others. These conditions may so hinder the market for
votes that log-rolling does not become effective, leaving simple ma-
jority rule. The risk of these conditions developing is of course even
greater in political units smaller than states: cities, counties, special
districts.2 7
The Reasons for Generality
Having sketched the source of the requirement that legislation
be general, we turn to consideration of why there should be such a
requirement. Federalist No. 57 suggests that representatives will be
constrained from oppressive measures because laws will operate on
them and their friends. This suggestion is true for laws of general
application, but not for those dealing with more specific matters, such
as the interests of an individual or of a state. A more developed ex-
planation of the requirement that legislation be general rather than
particular could be found a few generations later:
[W]hen, in the exercise of proper legislative powers, general
laws are enacted, which bear or may bear on the whole com-
munity, if they are unjust and against the spirit of the consti-
tution, the whole community will be interested to procure
their repeal by a voice potential. And that is the great secur-
ity for just and fair legislation.
But when the individuals are selected from the mass,
assembly. City of Denver v. Mercantile Trust Co., 201 F. 790, 798-99 (8th Cir. 1912).
"The general assembly shall pass no law for the benefit of [any corporation or individual]
. . . retrospective in its operation, or which imposes on the people of any . . municipal subdi-
vision . . . a new liability in respect to transactions . . . already past." Art. XV, § 12.
Similar restrictions were added to the laws of many states in the latter nineteenth century.
For further discussion, see S. SATO & A. VAN ALSTYNE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW 191-208 (1970); D. MANDELKE & D. NETSCH, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A
FEDERAL SYSTEM 628-53 (1977).
27. See Note, City Government in the State Courts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1596 (1965). It
may be noted that the abuses feared here are directed at residents of the unit. The special
concern of a federal system with discrimination against non-residents or interstate commerce
would present further problems.
1980]
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and laws are enacted affecting their property, . . . who is to
stand up for them, thus isolated from the mass, in injury and
injustice, or where are they to seek relief from such acts of
despotic power?2 8
It is important to note also that narrow benefits may be as undesir-
able a legislative product as are narrow burdens:
The inherent vice of special laws is that they create prefer-
ences and establish irregularities. As an inevitable conse-
quence, their enactment leads to improvident and ill-consid-
ered legislation. The members whose particular constituents
are not affected by a proposed special law become indifferent
to its passage. . . . The time which the Legislature would
otherwise devote to the consideration of measures of public
importance is frittered away in the granting of special favors
to private or corporate interests or to local communities.
Meanwhile, in place of a symmetrical body of statutory law
on subjects of general and common interest to the whole peo-
ple, we have a wilderness of special provisions . . . . Worse
still, rights and privileges, which should only result from the
decree of a court of competent jurisdiction after a full hear-
ing and notice to all parties in interest, are conferred upon
individuals and private corporations by special acts of the
Legislature, without any pretense of investigation as to mer-
its, or of notice to adverse parties.
. . . 'When it acts upon a public bill, a Legislature leg-
islates; when it acts upon a private bill, it adjudicates. It
passes from the function of a lawmaker to that of a judge. It
is transformed from a tribune of the people into a justice
shop for the seeker after special privilege."19
These passages suggest why under log-rolling theory legislation
should be general rather than particular. Log-rolling is a very sophis-
ticated social institution. It allows a great many issues to be resolved
quickly, in light of both the breadth and intensity of citizen concern,
28. Ervine's Appeal, 16 Pa. 256, 268 (1851), quoted in ELY, supra note 1. Courts pro-
vide relief to individuals selected from the mass and subjected to despotic acts. Non-discrimi-
nation has also been used as a check against state obstruction of interstate commerce (South
Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938)) or state taxes
burdening the federal government (United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1977)).
29. Anderson v. Board of Commissioners, 77 Kan. 721, 95 P. 583 (1908). The court's
quotation is from Orth, Special Legislation, 97 THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY 69 (1906). Of
course citizens seeking to challenge a narrow legislative benefit may not succeed in demon-
strating that they have standing.
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in a way that makes it unlikely any citizen will lose on every issue.
Yet it can be a crude process if addressed to narrow matters. Mem-
bers of a small group may be at a serious disadvantage in the log-
rolling process if its enemies are numerous, particularly if members
of that small group are disinclined to engage in political activity.
This small group will be less vulnerable, as indicated in the quoted
passages, if its enemies must act generally rather than narrowly. The
imposition of burdens, if done generally rather than only on this
group, will produce allies for the group from among the other per-
sons burdened. Some of these allies may be more inclined toward
political activity, or might even have been originally among the
group's enemies. In contrast, if the legislature is considered without
regard for the process of log-rolling, i.e. if the legislature is consid-
ered to resolve issues on the basis of wisdom, then it would seem no
less wise when it acted narrowly.
Pressure Toward Particularity
Unfortunately, the constitutional requirement that legislatures
should operate on general principles rather than decide particular
cases conflicts with practical forces pushing legislatures in the oppo-
site direction. In economic terms, one engages in political activity in
order to secure benefits. Only if the benefits' value as discounted by
the risk of failure exceeds the cost of engaging in political activity
will that activity be undertaken. Society as an aggregate has a net
gain from a particular political activity if its total costs to the entire
society are less than its total benefits. Whether to undertake a politi-
cal project, however, is not decided by society but by individuals. It
is likely that the person contemplating political activity will look only
to his own costs and benefits. Thus the system is more likely to en-
courage pursuit of particular benefits, most of which those involved
in the political campaign can expect to capture, than of general ben-
efits, most of which will be enjoyed by free-riders.80 A similar prefer-
ence for particular rather than general benefits can be deduced with-
out resort to economics. One might expect a person to be less
grateful for the sun which, although vital to life, shines on everyone,
than for a trinket which that person alone receives. Thus a partici-
pant in the political process, whether viewed as an economic or as a
psychological being, is likely to seek particularized benefits. 1
30. See Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely
To Constitutional Theory. 89 YALE L. J. 1037, 1054 (1980).
31. For an analysis of the particularization of the federal income tax, see Surrey, The
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The political system can be expected to respond to constituent
interest in particular benefits by producing particular laws. The de-
tail and complexity of much modern legislation82 would seem to be
as much the result of this process as a reflection of the complexity of
our society and economy. Such detail and complexity, in addition to
being a product of the political system not functioning properly, are
also a barrier to that system's proper functioning. They conceal the
legislative product, so that the citizen's ability to evaluate the repre-
sentative is impaired. In some areas the complexity may become so
great as to prevent representatives from understanding proposed leg-
islation.88 Hidden in the detail and complexity of special benefits
may be special retribution for opponents, or special benefits may be-
come so common that not to have a benefit is punishment enough.
Constitutional Generality vs. Practical Particularity
The constitutional restrictions on particular action by legisla-
tures suggest a hope by the drafters and ratifiers that competing
groups in society would push back and forth as to the location of
general lines. The reality is that the lines are often particular, intri-
cate, and gerrymandered.
Thus we have a political system with a fundamental conflict: the
Constitution seems to be premised on the idea that legislatures
should decide general policies, yet practical forces incline the legisla-
ture instead to decide particular questions. The Constitution of
course speaks to both legislators and judges, and both must respond
to practical forces. How should their actions be affected by an
Congress and the Tax Lobbyist - How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted, 70 HARV. L.
REV. 1145 (1957).
32. "We have had occasion to note the striking resemblance between some of the laws
we are called upon to interpret and King Minos's labyrinth in ancient Crete." Lok v. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2nd Cir. 1977).
33. Congressional debates ordinarily do not illuminate technical problems of fed-
eral taxation. . . . The committee reports, on the other hand, are frequently helpful,
and it is common for the courts to rely heavily on them .... Because of the profu-
sion of technical detail and because some members of the committee may know
little of the content of the committee's reports (and this is a fortiori true of the
members of Congress who do not serve on the tax committees), it might be said that
they are not evidence of the "intent" of Congress unless we apply the doctrine of
respondeat superior. However, the same might be said of the statutes themselves (as
well as many other complex statutes) since many members of Congress, including
some on the tax committees, do not understand the technical detail of the statutes
and instead rely on the representations of the "technicians" regarding the contents
of the statute and the committee reports.
B. BITTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 38-39 (5th ed. 1980).
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awareness of this conflict? Unfortunately, here, as in so many places,
the answer does not appear as a clear formula but only as some fac-
tors to be considered. A legislator should examine the many particu-
lar matters demanding attention, hoping to be able to find general or
similar problems for which general solutions would be appropriate.
This process would be analogous to the common law development of
general rules by a process of induction from various particular cases.
Judges should of course be aware of the deference they owe to
the politically responsible branches. But judges should also be aware
that the political system presumes that legislative decisions will be
achieved through log-rolling and that log-rolling is considered appro-
priate for general matters, but not for narrow ones. If it were possible
for courts to determine that log-rolling was not occurring, then it
might be appropriate to give less deference to legislation not the
product of log-rolling. But it is not clear that such determinations
are possible. 3' Given the practical forces tending to produce narrow
legislation, and the difficulty in identifying what is "narrow," it is
probably unrealistic to suggest that legislation should be invalidated
solely because it is narrow in scope. It seems appropriate, however,
for the courts to give less deference to legislation as the legislation
becomes more narrow. This judicial check on fairness is appropriate
when the intended institutional checks of log-rolling and generality
are not operating. Thus the constitutional ground for invalidating
legislation is that the legislation violates the generality requirement.
That ground will not be invoked merely because legislation is nar-
row, but only if, in addition to being narrow, the legislation is unfair.
III. CONCLUSION
Professor Ely concludes his recent book with a discussion of a
hypothetical statute banning gall bladder removal except where nec-
essary to save the life of the patient.30 He analyzes the statute under
his theories: it is unfair, but unfairness alone is not enough to invali-
date a statute, and he finds no additional vices. Under log-rolling
theory the statute has an additional vice, its narrowness, which may
make it unconstitutional. The concepts "narrow" and "unfair" will
have to be developed before reaching a final conclusion about this
statute, but to develop these concepts is a task for another day.
34. For a suggestion of factors which might indicate the absence of log-rolling, see ELY,
supra note 1, at 135-79.
35. ELY, supra note I, at 182-83. The hypothetical is from Wellington, Common Law
Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L. J.
221, 304-05 (1973).
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